This paper explores "conflict mining-related sexual violence" as a type of conflict sexual violence, tracing the dynamic process by which this category is defined in and through the production of research. Focusing on two "conflict minerals" initiatives, I explore how data on sexual violence are positioned as an indicator for assessing armed conflict and human rights abuses in mining areas in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. I trace the methodological decisions and epistemic claims that shape what is knowable about mining-related sexual violence and which erase the significant methodological challenges in researching sexualand gender-based violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Introduction
Conflict sexual violence, as a category of research, political mobilization, and international criminal prosecution, is relatively new. Most studies (Buss 2009; Mibenge 2013) point to the 1990s and onwards as a time when women's experience of sexualized violence during armed conflict was described and made visible as the category "conflict sexual violence." Practices of sexual violence linked to armed conflict are not new, of course (Heineman 2011) , and do not just affect women. But the existence of the category "conflict sexual violence" signals a particular legibility of certain types of violence and actors (Baaz and Stern 2013; Mertens 2018; Mertens and Pardy 2016) . My interest in this paper is with the conditions that produce and result from this legibility, and the role of epistemological and methodological decisions that shape what is seen as "conflict sexual violence." the sale of high-value minerals, took hold in some international circles. Interventions to better regulate international mineral supply chains resulted, as did funding for services for Congolese rape victims (among other developments). Numerous scholars (Autesserre 2012; Baaz and Stern 2013; Douma and Hilhorst 2012; Mertens 2018) have noted that sexual violence in DRC, while serious, was disproportionately emphasized by the international aid and advocacy communities. DRC's moniker as the "rape capital of the world" buttressed simplistic characterizations of the conflict in terms of mass sexual violence, coding DRC's armed conflict in terms of exceptional "pain and horror" (Mertens and Pardy 2016, 2) . Within this context, data on sexual violence are now included in some initiatives to address conflict mining as means to indicate the presence (or absence) of conflict and extreme human rights abuse in mining areas, as I explore in the second and third sections of this paper.
The gathering and marshalling of sexual violence data in relation to "conflict free" mining initiatives is still in the early stages and it is too soon to offer an in-depth analysis of how these data, and their use in these initiatives will develop. My more immediate objectives in this paper are three-fold. First, I trace in the first section the emergence of the category "conflict-miningrelated sexual violence," the conditions in which it has unfolded, and the processes by which the boundaries of the category are now being established in two main transnational policy sites: the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas and section 1502 of the Wall Street Reform Act in the United States. These two initiatives are among the most authoritative normative standards governing corporate involvement in mining and mineral supply chains from conflict-affected or fragile states and both are driving the production of research and data on sexual violence to indicate a nexus between armed conflict and mineral extraction.
The emergence of the category "conflict-mining-related sexual violence," I argue, illustrates the interrelationship between the conditions in which some types of harm can be named, some types subjectivities (victims, perpetrators) are thinkable, and certain forms and sources of knowledge are seen as possible and authoritative about those harms (Escobar 1995) . Exploring how this inter-relationship is constituting the boundaries around "conflict-miningrelated sexual violence" as a "kind" of violence (Hacking 2006 ) is my second objective. I argue in the following that "conflict-mining-related sexual violence" is taking shape in some of the main "conflict free" mining initiatives as a narrowly defined type of violence, most often understood as a form of rape enacted as a "weapon of war." This version of conflict-mining-related sexual violence, I demonstrate below, unfolds in and through empirical analyses where expectations about the forms of sexual violence assumed to be conflictmining related are already embedded within decisions on methodology and epistemology, even while the relationship between conflict, mining, and sexual violence is far from clear. The challenges to gathering data on sexual violence in mining and conflict settings are persistently underplayed or erased in the conflict-free mining initiatives explored here. The result is that the complex contexts of sexual-and gender-based violence in mining regions are also often underplayed or erased.
Other studies have similarly documented how methodological limitations of conflict sexual violence studies are erased as research is taken up in policy and scholarly contexts (see e.g. Cohen and Green 2012; Davies and True 2017, 2017; Ni Aolain 2014) . These erasures are particularly salient given the political contexts in which "the very establishment of sexual harm itself constitutes a distinct gender politics, tied to a broader political frame allowing certain kinds of interventions . . . " (Ni Aolain 2014, 4; see also Davies and True 2017, 17) . The representational contexts in which sexual violence research is conducted and findings mobilized are imbricated in the very narrative structures by which both armed actors and international intervention proponents claim their authority.
My third objective in this paper, then, is to consider how the mobilization of "conflict-mining-related sexual violence" as a knowledge category is unfolding alongside and informed by the "long history of representing Congo in racialized and sexualized terms" (Mertens 2018, 5) , the effects of which are to localize (to DRC) and simplify (to some forms of sexual violence and types of actors) the causes and effects of violence, and the appropriateness of certain interventions. Within the limits of this paper, my consideration of the representational contexts of DRC and resource governance is necessarily preliminary. But the linkages drawn between sexual violence, conflict, and mining also speak to a broader conversation about the gendered and sexualized depictions of resource extraction violence that can serve, in some contexts, to locate the origins of that violence within African communities disconnecting it from "a larger political economy of violence" in which resource extraction unfolds (Turcotte 2011, 201; Buss and Rutherford 2017, 49) .
My analysis in this paper presents a sometimes critical account of "conflict-mining-related sexual violence" as a knowledge category used within the growing array of data generating, "conflict-mining-free" initiatives. I argue here that the mobilization of this category may be creating an unsustainable hierarchy between violence that is monitored as indicative of conflict and human rights abusive mining (i.e. mass rape), and violence that is not (i.e. gender-based violence). However, there are other, promising approaches among actors generating research and data in this area, 2 and the final section discusses one such initiative. This paper itself emerges from two projects undertaken with multiple partners in Africa and Canada, 3 researching women's mining livelihoods in six African countries, including three at the heart of the "conflict minerals" interventions: DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. Those mixedmethods studies inform the backdrop to my discussion but my analysis here unfolds primarily through a textual study of the legal and policy documents connected to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance and section 1502, supplemented with some interview material of actors involved in drafting those documents.
Making the Link: DRC, Sexual Violence, and Conflict Minerals
Armed conflict in the eastern regions of DRC, which had been ongoing since 1996 (Stearns 2011, 8) , only belatedly began attracting international attention and action in the first decade of the 2000s. At that time, sexual violence in DRC became a defining feature of Western depictions of the conflict, shaping in turn, the forms of international intervention that gradually unfolded (Autesserre 2012) . "Congo" was inscribed in the Western imaginary in terms of exceptional brutality, of which sexual violence was a defining feature (Baaz and Stern 2013; Mertens and Pardy 2016) . The resulting international interventions over-focused on sexual violence-related initiatives, diverting donor funding from addressing other forms of violence, while creating perverse incentives that may have increased rates of sexual violence (Autesserre 2012, 205) . Douma and Hilhorst (2012) describe the result as the "commercialization" of sexual violence in DRC, pointing to the political economies that emerged around donor funding for sexual-violence programming in DRC which they conclude created incentives for women to self-identify as sexual violence victims.
Throughout the first decade of the 2000s, armed conflict and sexual violence in DRC were increasingly linked to exploitation and trade in "conflict minerals." In 2000, the United Nations Security Council authorized the establishment of an "Expert Panel" to investigate the links between "illegal exploitation of natural resources" and armed conflict (UN Security Council 2000) . Over several reports, the Panel concluded that the conflict in DRC had "become mainly about access, control and trade of five key natural resources: coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt, and gold" (UN Security Council 2001, 213-14) . These minerals are used in machinery and electronic devices, such as mobile phones and laptops computers, leading some advocacy organizations in Europe and North American to emphasize a connection between the abuses, including sexual violence in DRC and the consumption of electronic goods in the global North (see below).
Severine Autesserre (2012) argues that these preoccupations with conflict mining and sexual violence became woven into a single narrative of the DRC conflict as caused by "the illegal exploitation of natural resources," the most significant consequence of which was the "sexual abuse against women and girls" (204) . In this framing, she says, a simple equation was drawn between mining, weapons purchases, and increased rates of sexual violence, an equation that sidelined complex causes of sexual violence-"poverty, land conflict, hostile civil-military relationships, disorganization of the army and the police, weakness of the justice system, physical and economic insecurity, and oppressive gender norms" (217)-and bolstered problematic solutions focused predominantly on ending conflict mining.
While various actors pointed to a link between mining, conflict, and sexual violence in eastern DRC, there was little explication of how these are related; were the rapes happening in the mines? As a means to subdue a population near the mines? To coerce labor? To extract money? Different actors seemed to hint at different theories but without sustained explanation or systematic investigation. Yet, the "fact" of this relationship seems to endure. In the following discussion, I suggest there is little evidence of a straightforward relationship between mining, conflict, and sexual violence. Though these indeed may be related in some way, the evidence needed to establish this is complex and not readily available. The ease with which a relationship between mining, conflict, and sexual violence is presumed (rather than demonstrated), I argue, points to the cognitive scaffolding provided by the association of DRC with barbarism and brutality. Seemingly disparate phenomena-mineral extraction, armed conflict, sexual violence-can be "logically" linked together when raw horror and inexplicable violence provide the necessary backdrop. Presumptions about the inevitable and timeless nature of that violence also paper over the gaps in what we know about these phenomena.
Sexual Violence and Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining: Methodological Challenges Sexual violence was only ever briefly mention in the Panel of Experts reports and only as a second-order effect of resource conflict (see e.g. UN Security Council 2002, 125) . Nonetheless, sexual violence as related to conflict mining featured in advocacy campaigns by organizations in Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States who began to highlight concerns with "conflict minerals" and their connection with everyday electronics consumed predominantly in the global North (for discussion, see Cuvelier et al. 2014, 6-7; Seay 2012) . Advocacy organizations such as John Prendergast's The Enough Project claimed a "deadly nexus between the worst violence against women in the world and the purchase of electronics products containing conflict minerals from the Congo" (Prendergast 2009 ). The United Nations' Special Representatives on Sexual Violence, Margot Wallström (2010) and her successor Zainab Hawa Bangura (2014), both spoke publicly about how "Congo's natural resources and minerals" were enriching "militant groups, who have employed sexual violence as a tactic of war" (Wallström 2010) , where rape was enacted as "a weapon of war to secure access to conflict minerals" (Bangura 2014 ). Yet, in none of these claims is the nexus between conflict, mining, and sexual violence elaborated. Some scholarly studies explored the presumed relationship between conflict mining and sexual violence, but here too there was-and remains-a lack of data. Sara Meger (2010) provided one of the early academic investigations, drawing on feminist theory, research by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the UN, to conclude that sexual violence in eastern DRC was being used instrumentally to "instil fear in the civilian population, effectively restricting freedom of movement and regular economic activity, giving the armed group the liberty to take over control of" mining-related economic activities (133). Her investigation is analytically rich but based primarily on textual study and interviews with policy actors. A 2016 study (Rustad, Østby, and Nordås 2016) provides one of the few efforts to examine a correlation between sexual violence and conflict mining using quantitative data. The authors correlate data from the International Peace Information Service (IPIS) study 4 on the presence of armed actors in eastern DRC's mining areas, with sexual violence statistics from the 2013/14 DRC Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), concluding that women in the eastern provinces who live near artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sites are "more likely to experience sexual violence by both intimate partners and others" with the risks of violence "particularly high for women that live close to a mine where one or more armed actors are present" (Rustad, Østby, and Nordås 2016, 476) . This study is also not based on field investigations of mining areas, but on quantitative analysis of two separate, externally produced data sets for the more limited, but important purpose of testing "the relationships between ASM and sexual violence" (Rustad, Østby, and Nordås 2016, 483) . For my purposes here, an exploration of why these data are unable to illuminate the nexus between ASM, armed conflict, and sexual violence is a useful starting place for examining the challenges in researching sexual violence and ASM and the implications this has for research methodologies.
First, the presence of armed actors in mining sites (which the IPIS data provides) does not necessarily indicate how and to what extent a mining site is "conflict affected" (Seay 2012) . Armed actors, including their spouses, are involved in various livelihoods and conflict-economies (Alusala 2016; Schouten, Murairi, and Kubuya 2017) , defying straightforward causal connections between armed actors, their presence in mine sites, and the role of mining in contributing to ongoing conflict.
Second, while Rustad et al. conclude there is a geographic correlation between mining areas and rates of sexual violence, the DHS data on which they rely are not necessarily capturing violence within mining communities (and particularly mining communities that are more remote and difficult to access), or sexual violence experienced by women while living or working in the mining area. In addition to the limitations of a survey instrument such as the DHS in gathering reliable data on sexual violence (Johnson 2015) , and particularly one implemented in a post-conflict, large and geographically challenging country, the questions on sexual violence 5 are limited. The survey questions ask female respondents if they have ever been forced to have sexual relations or perform other sexual acts in their life, in the past twelve months, and the abuser's relationship to them (family member, teacher, unknown, etc.). Artisanal mining communities, particularly in parts of eastern DRC can be highly mobile Maclin et al. 2017) , moving to and from mine sites in search of better mining yields, fleeing armed conflict and violence, and livelihood diversification. It is not clear, then, if the data on sexual violence used by Rustad et al. relate to sexual violence women experienced in the mining areas, or sexual violence that may have happened earlier or elsewhere. 6 Third, even if the sexual violence occurred while women were in the vicinity of mining areas, the data are indeterminate about the contexts in which women experience violence (in the mining sites? In relation to a miningrelated livelihood? Or in another context?). Although the authors analyzed if the data demonstrated a relationship between women living close to ASM sites, sexual violence, and "working outside the home," they found no significant relationship, noting the limitations of the indicator "working outside the home." In the context of high rates of women's participation in the informal economy and their roles in providing food and household expenses through various livelihood strategies, "working outside the home" is a crude indicator. Hence, while Rustad et al.'s study, which is an important finding, finds a correlation between mining, the presence of armed actors, and sexual violence, the relationship between these is still unclear.
Research from mixed-method and ethnographic studies (see e.g. Bashwira et al. 2014; Labonne 1996) , in contrast, suggests that women are significantly involved in mining (often in processing roles) and miningrelated (i.e. vending, service provision) livelihoods, sometimes alongside other livelihoods, such as agriculture. This and other research (Cuvelier 2017; Geenen 2013; Kelly, King-Close, and Perks 2014) highlights various gender norms, identities, and structures governing ASM activities and relations and that can give rise to multiple forms of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) (see below). The violence, relations, and livelihoods in these sites do not fit neatly into the DHS questions on sexual violence or "work outside the home," and, in any event would require mixed research methods to discern as I explain below.
ASM is a rudimentary, labor-intensive form of mining, providing an important livelihood to large numbers of people, of which a significant percentage are likely women (approximately 30 percent depending on the mineral, geology, and location) (Hinton, Veiga, and Beinhoff 2003, 1) . ASM provides one of the few sources of livelihood that endured through the wars (Kelly 2014, 102) . While economically important to the region, women and men work in ASM in a "grey zone" of legality, often without formal licenses, and enmeshed in complex webs of state and nonstate regulation (Geenen 2011; . Customary chiefs, land or license owners, financers, husbands/family members, and gold buyers all structure women's access to work in mine sites , and can be (but are not necessarily) exploitative, in conditions that may expose women to SGBV. There are "close links between economic and sexual exploitation" in ASM sites (Kelly, King-Close, and Perks 2014, 100 ; see also Hayes and Perks 2012) , in which women navigate a "complex topography of sexual vulnerability where the lines between forced, coerced and transactional sex are blurred" (Kelly, King-Close, and Perks 2014, 103 ; see also Mahy 2011) .
At the same time, ASM livelihoods are far more lucrative for women and men than available alternatives (Stewart, Kibombo, and Rankin 2018) . While women and men lead difficult lives in ASM sites, the research also suggests that the range of livelihoods that women carry out-from owning and operating mines, doing the physically demanding mineral processing work, to selling food, sex, and domestic services-are contexts in which women accrue livelihoods, capital, voice, and sometimes status (Bashwira et al. 2014, 112-13; Buss et al. 2017, 38-47) . Women are also active decision makers navigating these different livelihoods. Finally, the exploitative conditions in mining are distinctly gendered, impacting men who are working in dangerous, insecure conditions as well. In this context, it is difficult to know if women and men have a vocabulary in which to describe their experiences as SGBV. For some women and men, the experiences of violence may be so commonplace that they do not conceive of these as notable. For others, the language of rape and sexual violence may be used to capture a range of experiences. As one male miner commented to researchers: "Ya kila qualite na aina iko hapa nyabibwe (There is sexual violence of every quality and kind here in Nyabibwe). When god built the mine here he knew that rape would be there as well with the mine" (quoted in Kelly, King-Close, and Perks 2014, 101). For others still, the urgency of earning a livelihood for themselves and their families may marginalize concerns about personal insecurity.
Researchers of conflict sexual violence have noted the many difficulties in gathering data on sexual violence in conflict-affected regions: women may be hard to locate in insecure or impermanent locations (Ni Aolain 2014); there may be a pervasive silence about SGBV because of a "culture of impunity" (Davies and True 2017, 8) or "immense, social, legal and economic obstacles" to reporting (Davies and True 2017, 9) ; gendered and raced norms may result in "highly gendered patterns of disclosure by victims and reporting by researchers and institutions" (Dolan 2016, 632) ; accessing women victims through service providers may lead to partial or distorted results; and stigma or threats of further violence may prevent women and men from coming forward (Dolan 2016) .
The patterns of pervasive violence and economic exploitation, coupled with strategic negotiation by women and men of circumscribed livelihood options in ASM, create distinct challenges for research and data gathering. Distinguishing between types of sexual violence (is it mining related? Because of militias? Interpersonal or stranger? Widespread or episodic?) is difficult because of the contexts of constrained agency (Utas 2005) where the lines between sexual predation, prostitution, and exchange are unclear. It is hard to known in this context with what constraints women and men answer survey questions (Davies and True 2017) . Research and data gathering are not impossible in this context, but these challenges highlight the limitations of data gathered through surveys or other methodologies that do not sufficiently account for, and adapt to, these challenges by, for example, having longer and more frequent visits to the region, using mixed qualitative and quantitative methods to test research findings, and working with communities to establish trust.
But as I demonstrate below, these considerable challenges disappear from the conduct and mobilization of sexual violence research in the unfolding international initiatives on monitoring mining and mineral supply chains from central Africa. SGBV as an indicator of conflict and/or human rights abusive mining contexts is now emerging in these initiatives, requiring the production of research on this topic. As I explore below, the complex social geographies of the mining areas described above, and the challenges this poses for conducting research on SGBV appears to be set aside as the focus turns to defining and marshalling data on conflict-mining-related sexual violence.
Regulating Conflict-Mining and the Emergence of Sexual Violence as a Knowledge Category
The dominant narrative that emerged in the 2000s of the DRC conflicts in terms of mining-fueled violence led to interventions to reduce armed actors' access to mining income by which to buy weapons, with the intention of slowing down the conflict itself and consequently sexual violence and other human rights abuses . The resulting initiatives to end conflict-affected dimensions of ASM and provide "clean" minerals from central Africa has developed into a large, significant field beyond the scope of this paper. Some studies Seay 2012; Vogel 2014) argue that "conflict-free" certification initiatives will not diminish conflict and human rights abuses in the region and may even be leading to new types of conflict, while others (Bafilemba, Mueller, and Lezhnev 2014) suggest the reverse. One of the overlooked effects of these mineral certification schemes is the demand generated for data on mining activities, including on "sexual violence" and "sexual-and gender-based violence," in order to monitor the mining-conflict nexus. In this section I trace this inclusion of sexual violence as an indicator of conflict and human rights affected mining in two influential initiatives; the due diligence guidelines developed by the OECD to guide corporate decision making on resource extraction; and section 1502 of the Wall Street Reform Act 2010, passed in the United States, requiring corporations to monitor and report on their use of "conflict minerals." Both use "sexual violence" as an indicator by which to determine if mining contexts are too prone to conflict or human rights abuse for corporate involvement. Drafted in the late 2000s and now on its third edition (2016), the OECD Due Diligence Guidance ("Guidance") has become a widely used industry "standard" for assessing if minerals are linked to conflict or human rights abuses. While ostensibly aimed at corporate decision making, the Guidance is also used within a growing number of initiatives certifying minerals as "conflict free," such as the iTRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (known as "iTSCi," and which I reference later in the paper), a "traceability and due diligence" scheme by which tin, tantalum, and tungsten mine and mineral supply chains are "audited" for "conflict" and human rights abuses. 8 The Guidance is a "collaborative government-backed multi-stakeholder initiative" intended "to help companies respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral source practices" (OECD 2016, 3), through self-monitoring and reporting, techniques that are now common in corporate social responsibility schemes (Li 2009 ). The specific standards set by the Guidance are found in Annex II which provides a model supply chain policy enumerating the risks that corporations should investigate and monitor when operating in "conflict-affected and high-risk areas": i. any forms of torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; ii. any forms of forced or compulsory labour; iii. the worst forms of child labour; iv. other gross human rights violations and abuses such as widespread sexual violence; v. war crimes or other serious violations of international humanitarian law, crimes against humanity or genocide.
If any of these are present, the company should "immediately suspend or discontinue" its activities (s. 2, Annex II, OECD 2016).
According to a Canadian government lawyer active in developing the Guidance in the late 2000s (Interview with author, Ottawa, Canada, June 13, 2016), the "view at the time was that women were highly vulnerable to conflict and women were being terrorized (by militias getting access to mines)." The list of human rights abuses, the lawyer added, was devised through a "conflict lens" and "was negotiated with Congo in mind" at a time when "international response to the DRC conflict was extremely slow, extremely indecisive." The categorization of human rights abuses was intentionally set at a higher threshold because "if you say 'child labor', companies will disengage, so we settled for 'worst forms' of child labor." Similarly, "sexual violence," while included as part of the standard for determining intolerable risks, refers more specifically to "widespread" sexual violence that is associated with "gross human rights violations," reflecting the language used in the Statute of the International Criminal Court. The drafters appeared to have in mind not just any sexual violence, but a particular pattern ("widespread"), likely reflecting the view discussed above that the conflict in DRC and sexual violence was fueled by militia access to minerals.
Section 1502 and Conflict Minerals-Sexual Violence Nexus
Overlapping in time with the OECD Guidance, the United States Congress passed section 1502, a small provision embedded in the large Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (United States Congress 2010) regulating the "too big to fail" banks. Section 1502, added to this Act for legislative convenience, is focused on a different purpose: regulating corporate use of minerals from central Africa by requiring corporate self-disclosure and public reporting. Corporations registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) must report annually on how and from where they source tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold (3TGs), the four named minerals seen as conflict affected. The provision does not prohibit corporations from extracting, buying, or using minerals implicated in armed conflict. It only requires corporate reporting on where the minerals came from, and the steps taken, if any, to ensure corporate products do not contribute to conflict. While this is a "soft" form of regulation, tracking minerals and their linkages to conflict is difficult and expensive. The vast majority of 3TGs from central Africa move through informal trade networks, ending up in smelters where they are combined with so-called "legitimate" minerals from various parts of the globe, and sold on from there. In effect, section 1502 and the OECD Guidance are pushing corporations, and local and regional governments to build new mineral supply chains that can be certified as conflict-free "upstream" from the smelter to the mine site, and then downstream, from the smelter to corporate buyers .
Section 1502 is the product of a range of considerations (Whitney 2015, 184) , but concerns about human rights abuses including sexual violence predominated. Section 1502's legislative journey began with separate bills in the U.S. House of Representatives 9 and Senate 10 to regulate the trade in DRC minerals. Both of those bills contained "findings of fact" explaining the bill's rationale and both highlighted sexual violence in DRC as a motivating concern. The thirteen paragraphs of findings in section 2 of the Senate Bill S. 891, for example, begin by noting that "widespread human rights violations" (para 1) in the wars in the DRC have occurred, "high levels of poverty, insecurity, and a culture of impunity" endure in the eastern region (para 2), with an estimated 5,400,000 deaths since 1998 (para 3). Sexual violence and rape (para 4) "remain pervasive tools of warfare used by all parties . . . to terrorize and humiliate communities, resulting in community break down which causes a decrease in [their] ability . . . to resist control by illegal armed forces and a loss of community access to minerals . . . " According to Toby Whitney, Senatorial and Congressional staff spent considerable time and energy, going over the wording of the agreed facts, carefully parsing the language that would eventually appear in the preamble (Interview with Whitney by Skype, October 16, 2015) . In section 1502, these lengthy findings are reduced to a single sentence: "the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual-and gender-based violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation." In a joint press conference, 11 the sponsoring legislators (Democrat Jim McDermott and Republican Sam Brownback) emphasized their personal concerns with the high levels of violence, including "child soldiers, rape and slaves as 'tools of war'." Section 1502 has been subject to extensive critique by scholars and activists working in DRC (Seay 2012; Vogel 2014 ) who have argued the provision is based on a simplistic understanding of the conflict, is harmful to local communities who rely on mining, and will have minimal positive effects in building opportunities for "clean" mining. Industry groups, meanwhile, launched legal challenges to section 1502, echoing some of these arguments but also claiming, partially successfully, the provision is a legislative over-reach by the SEC (see Harder, Medford, and Berg 2017) .
Despite these critiques, both section 1502 and the Guidance have generated a demand for different schemes to audit mineral supply chains and their conflict and human rights dimensions. These auditing processes are difficult and technical, requiring research and data on mining contexts in central Africa. Information thus has emerged as a commodity in its own right and a key governing technology in this sector (Power 1997) .
Research and knowledge on sexual violence are also in demand primarily, as I discuss below, as one means to assess human rights and conflict "risks" associated with mining. In the following sections I explore how "sexual violence," as an indicator of risk, is defined by actors who are engaging in the technical business of producing information about conflict mining. My analysis focuses on two contexts: the annual reports of the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) required by section 1502; and two examples where the OECD Guidance is used by research teams assessing the suitability for "clean mining" initiatives in eastern DRC. While these contexts rely on different types of research-quantitative in the GAO reports, qualitative in the regional assessments-both are sites where sexual violence in relation to conflict-mining is defined, and defined quite narrowly.
Second, these sites are also contexts where the parameters of knowledge about sexual violence are set, prioritizing some epistemic values over others.
In both examples, the substantial challenges in gathering reliable sexual violence data in the challenging contexts of ASM in central Africa are sidelined.
Defining "Conflict-Mining-Implicated Sexual Violence"
In the above discussion, I explored how concerns about sexual violence in central Africa became woven into two, leading initiatives-the U.S. provision section 1502 and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance-that aim to regulate the mining and trade of four minerals from central Africa. These two initiatives, I explained, rely on the production of information, including on sexual violence, as a basis for regulation. In this section, I now examine how sexual violence is defined and mobilized as a knowledge category in these initiatives.
Section 1502: Defining Sexual Violence as "Indicator" Section 1502 of the Wall Street Reform Act, though primarily focused on corporate reporting, requires different agencies within the U.S. government to gather and report on information to monitor section 1502's effectiveness. The Comptroller-General (the "GAO"), for one, is required to produce a baseline, and then annual reports to Congress on the "rate of sexual-and gender-based violence in war-torn areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and adjoining countries." According to Toby Whitney, legislative aid to Congressmen Jim McDermott, data on rates of SGBV are required "to see whether this law is making a difference" (Interview with author by Skype, October 16, 2015) . The 2011 annual reports by GAO generated a baseline from which the impacts of section 1502 are assessed. Presumably, if rates of sexual violence in the region go down, section 1502 is seen as successful, and if the rates go up or are unchanged, the conclusion is the opposite.
The GAO annual reports set out information (studies and reports) on sexual violence in eastern DRC and neighboring countries, providing only minimal analyses of the data, beyond observations about rates of violence going up or down. What the reports do, importantly, is define both the parameters of "sexual violence" as an indicator of conflict mining, and the types of research and data deemed authoritative.
In its first annual report (2011), the GAO defined "sexual-and genderbased violence" and stipulated the kinds of research it sees as reliable for monitoring section 1502's effectiveness. For both, the GAO established narrow parameters. Section 1502 specifically requires the GAO to produce reports on "sexual-and gender-based violence." The GAO, however, interprets this as meaning just sexual violence. This decision is explained in a footnote as the result of conversations with "UN officials and researchers" who advised just focusing on sexual violence. The "UN officials" explained:
. . . 'sexual and gender-based violence' is redundant because sexual violence is included in the definition of gender-based violence. Violence against women, a form of gender-based violence, includes broad violations not related to sexual violence and refers to any act that results in 'physical, sexual, or mental harm or suffering to women'; UN officials said it includes forced early marriage, harmful traditional practices, and domestic abuse. Violence against women does not include sexual violence against adult males or boys and would include other types of nonsexual violence against women.
The logic of this analysis is unclear, but the overall result is the GAO will look for data on just "sexual violence" and not SGBV. Further, it narrows sexual violence to "any sexual act, attempted or perpetrated, such as rape or sexual slavery" (United States Government Accountability Office 2011, 1). This listing of "rape or sexual slavery" is an interpretive move by which the more expansive term-sexual violence-is limited by these narrower, specified terms. The GAO's conclusion in this benchmark-setting report is changing the legislative mandate from gathering data on SGBV to just sexual violence, and sexual violence defined more specifically as rape or sexual slavery. The ease with which a legislative mandate is arbitrarily changed to focus on a narrower range of violence is surprising and suggests, again, the strong affective pull that sexual violence, particularly in relation to DRC and central Africa, has on Western imaginaries (Autesserre 2012; Baaz and Stern 2010; Mertens 2018) .
Given the pervasive forms of SGBV that characterize ASM areas in eastern DRC discussed above, the limited focus on sexual violence (understood as akin to rape and sexual slavery) is additionally problematic. Counter to the GAO's stated intention of including data on sexual violence experienced by men, the focus only on sexual violence understood in terms of rape and sexual slavery makes this more difficult. Chris Dolan argues that sexual violence against men in conflict-affected settings is "intricately interconnected with sexual and other forms of gender-based violence against women, girls and boys" (2016, 628) . While sexual violence may indeed be a subset of genderbased violence, parsing them into separate categories makes it more difficult to identify patterns and types of conflict violence that have a sexualized component.
Finally, the GAO report discusses the kinds of data that can be used to assess rates of sexual violence, discounting types of research seen as unsuitable. The 2011 report asserts there are only "two basic types of data on sexual violence from war-torn eastern DRC and adjoining countries": population-based surveys and case files. Of these, population-based surveys are "more appropriate for estimating a rate of sexual violence" because they use "random sampling" and "their results are generalizable to a target population" (2011, (10) (11) (12) . The limitations of surveys are also noted (and over time the list of limitations grows: under-coverage, insecurity, underreporting, cost (US GAO 2016, 40) ) but surveys are still preferred as the gold standard (see e.g. US GAO 2012, 27) . Annual GAO reports also include some information from "case file data" (from service providers) but always noting their methodological limitations. The information included in these sections focus mostly on rape cases. Population-based surveys fitting the GAO's criteria only start emerging after 2014 and these are internationally funded (often with U.S. government support) and/or designed such as the Demographic and Health Survey, included in the 2015 GAO report.
The limitations of using population surveys as a source for determining rates of sexual violence for women and men in ASM sites in eastern DRC were outlined above. A further striking feature about the GAO reports is the repeated assertions that random sampling and generalizability are the markers of credible research on sexual violence. While these assertions are not unique to the GAO, each utterance re/produces "hierarchies between what is 'knowable' and what is not" (Merry and Coutin 2014, 1) , identifying objectivity (as indicated by random sampling and generalizability) as the sole "epistemic virtue" (Daston and Galison 2010 [2007] ) of consequence. There is no suggestion that gendered contexts that shape forms of sexual violence and the possibilities of reporting that violence (Davies and True 2017) are relevant considerations.
OECD Guidance and Assessments of Supply Chain Certification Suitability
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance standard is used in various initiatives to certify or monitor "conflict-free" mineral supply chains. The twelvecountry International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, for example, has included the Guidance as its standard, 11 while the Guidance is also used to audit mining areas under various supply chain certification schemes. The use of the Guidance for data gathering is still emerging and an analysis of the sexual violence standard in these data would be premature at this stage. Instead, I briefly outline two very different studies using qualitative research methodologies, and illustrating potentially different approaches to conducting research on sexual violence in relation to conflict and artisanal mining. These two examples, while preliminary, illustrate the kinds of methodological decisions and limits that emerge as data on sexual violence as a risk of conflict mining is gathered.
The ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi), is a responsible sourcing initiative focused on the mining and sale of tin from central Africa including DRC. In 2012 a feasibility study was conducted of tin mining in Maniema Province, eastern DRC to determine if a certification scheme could be introduced into the area. The study gathered and analyzed data on the risks of conflict mining and human rights abuses listed in the OECD Guidance, Annex 2 model policy discussed above, including "other gross human rights violations and abuses such as widespread sexual violence."
The resulting report, completed by the consulting firm Channel Research, was based on interviews and focus groups in Maniema over a ten-day period, June 2012. It found, among other things, "human rights abuses, in particular linked to the abuse of women" which occur "on a widespread basis" (2012, 8) . The report concluded that the "cases of abuse and sexual violence" were "linked to socio-cultural practices or ordinary deviant behavior" and hence, were not "directly associated" with mining (2012, 8) .
In explaining these findings, the report draws a distinction between sexual violence that is a pervasive form of "indirect exploitation" (14), and sexual violence that constitutes armed conflict-affected "grave human rights abuses." It concludes that "sexual violence against women is widespread at the various mining sites in Maniema" (15), but does not constitute "grave human rights abuses" indicative of conflict mining. Drawing on a report by academics based at the University of Wageningen (Douma and Hilhorst 2012) , the report concludes the "widespread" sexual violence resulted from either over-reporting/ misrepresentation by Congolese NGOs, or was "ordinary deviant behavior" (8) stemming from certain cultural practices in particular (15). "Sexual abuse of women in Maniema is for a large share to be explained by the submission of women according to customary traditions, as it also occurs in other provinces" (40). In its summary table of recommended mitigation steps for the risks identified, there are no recommendations to address sexual violence.
The researchers of this report seem to have a pre-formed expectation that there is a distinct form of violence that is "conflict-mining related" and which they implicitly use as a standard for assessing their research findings. Despite observing the culture of women's submission, the researchers do not consider how the interviews and focus group discussions should be adjusted to accommodate the resulting barriers to reporting sexual violence.
In the second example, the International Peace Information Service conducted a three-phase project to "enhance local capacities to monitor gold supply chains" in Mambasa, Ituri, DRC (de Brier and Merket 2017, 4) . Research teams of locally based civil society and government representatives were trained in "responsible sourcing and mine site monitoring" and then dispatched to over one hundred mine sites, once in the rainy and once in the dry seasons. The resulting report is rich in detail about the social dynamics of mining in the region, including on women's roles in mining and the gender division of mining labor. Among the study findings are reports of "sexual abuse of women" at seven mine sites, only one instance of which "by undisciplined military elements" (de Brier and Merket 2017, 5) , inadequate sanitary facilities (specifically referencing facilities for women), the possible prostitution of minors, and "an environment with a high risk of sexual harassment" (de Brier and Merket 2017, 33, 34) . Finally, the report notes that the actual numbers of "sexual abuse" are likely higher, calling for more "in-depth research . . . to unravel the full scope" (de Brier and Merket 2017, 34) .
The research methodology, with its use of trained local research teams (and efforts to build sustainable monitoring capacity in other "stakeholders"), its careful outreach to remote and difficult to access mine sites, and the ongoing work of IPIS in data generating in eastern DRC makes this a more reliable and comprehensive study, but it too has limitations. While giving more attention to SGBV, and the gendered division of labor in mining areas, it is not clear the researchers received much training in how to study SGBV. The report notes in a footnote, for example, that data on pregnancy were made possible because there were three women on the research team who provided gender sensitization (de Brier and Merket 2017, 33) . There is no information on how data on sexual violence was solicited, and/or if sexual violence against men was studied. Further, the report does not define "sexual abuse" or "sexual harassment."
Hence, in both these examples-the GAO reports under section 1502; the supply chain feasibility studies-the complexities of sexualized forms of violence in ASM, together with the considerable challenges of gathering research on conflict, mining and sexual violence are minimized. In the GAO reports, "data" and "sexual violence" are defined narrowly and specifically, effectively excluding a range of SGBV from consideration. Crucially, the GAO definitions of sexual violence and credible data are characterized not as the choices they are, but as epistemological truths. The two feasibility studies, one in Maniema on tin mining, the other in Mambasa on gold mining sites, are quite different in research approaches. The iTSCi feasibility study and its rapid methodology seems to mobilize an implicit understanding of "conflict-mining-related sexual violence" as something quite particular (though undefined) and discounts evidence of systemic SGBV as irrelevant considerations in supply chain certification. The research design gives little consideration to the particular challenges facing data collection in mining areas in DRC. The IPIS Mambasa study, meanwhile, is much more reflective on methodological requirements for researching armed conflict in the ASM sector including with the participation of local communities, but still gives insufficient consideration to the methodological challenges in gathering SGBV data.
The two contexts, while distinct, demonstrate the dynamic interplay between defining sexual violence and setting the parameters for gathering research and data on sexual violence. The boundaries around "sexual violence," as a knowledge category, are constituted in part through what is accepted as research on sexual violence, and what is acceptable as research is partly constituted by the simplification of what is understood to be sexual violence.
Conclusion
In this paper I have traced the emergence of "conflict-mining-related sexual violence" as a category through which knowledge on sexual violence and "conflict mining" is defined and hierarchically ordered. The relationship between sexual violence, conflict, and mineral extraction, while asserted as a fact, is far from clear. As this category has taken shape, the foundational assumption of a causal relationship between mining, armed conflict, and sexual violence is no longer visible as an assumption. Instead, a knowledge-gathering apparatus is established by which sexual violence data are assumed to indicate the existence of conflict mining violence, papering over the uncertainties about the relationship between sexual violence, armed conflict, and mining. More troubling, the need for more nuanced research and analysis of both sexual violence and the conditions of conflict linked to mineral extraction is also occluded from some contexts (though not all, as the IPIS Mambasa study discussed above suggests).
This result points to the importance of the micro contexts-the footnotes and the field notes-where both "sexual violence" and "good data" are defined. These micro contexts, I argue here, need to be seen in terms of the social orders that are constituted in and through the categories of violence, the forms of subjectivity, and the knowledge formats (Poovey 1998) that are authorized. The resulting apparatus obscures the "quiet power" (Merry and Coutin 2014, 8) that is enacted in and through the delimitation of what is seen and mobilized as "data" on "conflict-mining-related sexual violence."
A second argument I pursue is the importance of the representational contexts in which research on conflict sexual violence and SGBV relating to mining is carried out. The analysis in this paper underlines the work of scholars such as Escobar (1995) , Mertens (2018) , and others, demonstrating that both research and the policy and technical sites in which research is used, are themselves constituted by the gendered, sexed, raced hierarchies in which actors in the global North design and implement interventions in the global South. I have suggested that the coding of DRC in terms of exceptional violence enacts a cognitive scaffold on which knowledge about DRC is constituted, shaping what we think we know, and what we presume needs to be known.
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